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NOTE
SCOPE OF REVIEW IN MINNESOTA AND ITS
DEPENDENCE UPON THE FORM OF APPEAL TAKEN
INTRODUCTION
In Crawford v. JWoodrich Construction Co.,' a 1952 per curialu
decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court, there appeared the fol-
lowing statement:
"as any person who is informed in this matter knows, questios
that can be raised for review on appeal from an order denying
a motion for a new trial are quite different from and broader
than those that can be raised on appeal from an adverse jndg-
ment."2
This Note will address itself to the determination of tile meaning
and significance of this statement and will also attempt to ascertain
what questions are reviewable by the supreme court when an
appeal is taken from a judgment or from any of the other or(er,
which are appealable under the Minnesota Statutes The problem
here is not to discover what orders are appealable, but rather to
show what questions can be reviewed on the various appeals that
the statute allows. This Note will include a discussion of the proper
methods of preserving a question for review only insofar as that
problem relates to the principal problem.
The scope of review requires definition because in many in-
stances the supreme court has refused to review a particular ques-
tion on the ground that the order appealed from does not properly
raise the question for which review is asked. Accurate knowledge
of the scope of review is especially important to the lawyer's de-
cision whether to appeal from the judgment or from the order
denying new trial. It may seem that the danger of raising a particu
lar question on the wrong appeal can be eliminated by appealing
from both the judgment and the order denying new trial.4 Tl
Minnesota bar, however, has not shown a tendency to adopt such
a practice, probably because of several factors. First, it seems that
an entered judgment carries with it a stigma which attorneys seek
to avoid. Second, it appears that lawyers appeal from an order
denying new trial rather than from a judgment as a matter of habit.
the source of which is unknown. Also, there seems to be some prac-
1. 236 Minn. 547, 51 N. W. 2d 822 (1952).
2. Crawford v. Woodrich Constr. Co., 236 Minn. 547, 549-50, 51 N. W.
2d 822, 824 (1952).
3. See Minn. Stat. § 605.09 (1953). See also Cunningham, Appealable
Orders in Minnesota, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 309 (1953).
4. See In re Estate of Hore, 220 Minn. 365, 19 N. W. 2d 778 (1945).
tical advantage to an appeal from an order denying new trial. The
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutes make it pos-
sible to avoid entry of judgment before the appeal from an order
denying new trial is consummated.5 The risk run on appeal from
a judgment that a judgment lien may attach0 and that execution
may be levied between the time of the entry of judgment and the
filing of supersedeas bond7 may thus be avoided by appealing from
the order denying new trial.
Appeals from most of the intermediate orders pose no intricate
problems in scope of review because our court has held reviewable
only the single issue presented by the motion upon which the
intermediate order is made.8 In this respect these appeals differ
not only from appeals taken from orders determining a motion for
new trial and alternative motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or new trial, but also from appeals from a judgment
entered, all of which may require the review of more than one ques-
tion.
APPEALS FROM A JUDGIENT OR AN ORDER D iYiNG
A NEW TRIAL
The problems of which questions are reviewable on appeal from
a judgment and which are reviewable on appeal from an order
denying new trial will be considered together in order to make
dearer the differences in scope of review which exist between them.
In Shema v. Tlwrpe Bros.9 the court held that "in determining
the proper scope of review on appeal from a judgment, this court
looks to the origin of the judgment."10 In defining the scope of re-
view on appeal from an order denying new trial, the court has said
that "an appeal from an order brings up for review only the regu-
larity of those things which were involved in the order.""' Obviously
5. Minn. R. Civr P. 58.02 allows the trial court to stay entry of judg-
ment not more than thirty days after determination of the motion for new
trial, during which time appellant may file supersedeas bond pursuant to Miinn.
Stat. § 605.11 (1953) and thus suspend the power of the trial court to enterjudgment.
6. Minn. Stat. § 548.09 (1953) provides that a judgment lien does not
attach until docketing of the judgment.
7. Minn. Stat. § 605.12 (1953) provides that supersedeas bond may be
filed to suspend execution of an entered judgment pending appeal therefrom.
8. Potter v. Holmes, 72 Minn. 153, 75 N. W. 591 (1898); Hospes v.
Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 41 Minn. 256, 43 N. W. 180 (1889) ; Papke
v. Papke, 30 Minn. 260, 15 N. IV. 117 (1883); Griffin v. Jorgenson, 22 Minn.
92 (1875).
9. 238 Minn. 470, 57 N. W. 2d 157 (1953).
- 10. Shema v. Thorpe Bros., 238 Minn. 470, 471, 57 N. W. 2d 157
(1953).




neither statement really defines the scope of review for a practi-
tioner dealing with a specific problem. le still must determine
what can constitute the "origin of the judgment" and what "things"
can be "involved" in a particular order. It is necessary, therefore,
to examine the cases that have classified specific questions assigned
as error within the scope of review of either appeal.
Intermediate Orders
Section 605.09(1) of the Minnesota Statutes provides that ott
appeal from the judgment "the court may review any interniedi-
ate order involving the merits or necessarily affecting the judgment
appealed from.' 1 2 Generally, both non-appealable orders and appeal-
able orders from which no appeal has been taken come within the
scope of this provision, and it does not matter that the time for
appeal from the appealable orders has run.'-"
The case law does not set down any clear definition of the
words "involving the merits or necessarily affecting the judgment."
Some help is derived from the cases which interpret the phrase "in-
volving the merits" as it is used in section 605.09(3) of the
statutes.'" These cases construe the phrase to refer to an order
which decides the "positive" or strict legal rights of the parties
as opposed to an order which settles questions of practice and pro-
cedure or which depends upon the discretion of the trial court."5
An enlightening discussion of what constitutes an order "involving
the merits" can be found in an article by Alan Cunningham, cited
in footnote three of this Note. Because this phrase does not appear
to have had any real limiting effect on the scope of review on appeal
from a judgment, any discussion of particular orders here would
not be helpful.
There does not appear to have been any attempt by the court
to define comprehensively which orders are orders "affecting the
judgment." The court has been content instead to decide whether
a given question is reviewable or not as specific questions arise. It
may be helpful to examine first the orders which the court has
refused to review on appeal from judgment.
On an appeal from a judgment of dismissal without prejudice,
the court, in Bolstad v. Paul Bunyan Oil Co.,'0 refused to review
12. Minn. Stat. § 605.09(1) (1953).
13. Lundblad v. Erickson, 180 Minn. 185, 230 N. W. 473 (1930).
14. Minn. Stat. § 605.09(3) (1953). This section makes possible an
appeal "from an order involving the merits. . .
15. See, e.g., National Albany Exchange Bank v. Cargill, 39 Minn. 477,
40 N. W. 570 (1888) ; County of Chisago v. St. Paul & Duluth R. R., 27
Minn. 109, 6 N. W. 454 (1880). See also Cunningham, supra note 3, at 323-36.
16. 215 Minn. 166, 9 N. W. 2d 346 (1943).
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an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
disagreement of the jury. The court's reason for so refusing was
that the order was not a part of the proceedings resulting in the
judgment of dismissal. In that case the decision of the court seems
to have been motivated by the logical conclusion that an order
involving a consideration of the merits of the action could not be
said to affect a judgment based upon an order dismissing the
action on a procedural ground. Although the order did involve
the merits, the judgment itself did not. Thus it may be possible that
this case engrafts an exception on the statute that judgments grant-
ed on procedural grounds may only be attacked on the same
grounds.
In Keegan v. Peterson 7 the defendant, appealing from a judg-
ment notwithstanding a demurrer, sought review of an order refusing
leave to file an answer, but the court would not review the order
because it did not involve the merits or affect the judgment. The
reason underlying the Keegan holding was not set out in the
opinion, but the likelihood of that decision's having any future
effect is minimal in view of the fact that the question in that case
arose out of the technical procedural practices of 1877, which have
been replaced by the less technical Rules of Civil Procedure.' s Thus
the cases holding that a particular order does not affect the judg-
ment are only two, and these involve special situations. Of course,
orders made subsequent to entry of judgment are not intermediate
orders and, therefore, are not reviewable on appeal from the judg-
ment.19 There is no indication from the cases that the phrase "affect-
ing the judgment" has any real limiting effect on the scope of re-
view on appeal from the judgment.
The word "affect" is defined to mean "to act upon, change, or
influence."20 As it is used in the present context it could have either
a broad or narrow meaning. If used broadly, it would mean that
any order which might change or influence the judgment shall be
reviewed. If used narrowly, it would mean that only those orders
shall be reviewed which if reversed would definitely result in
17. 24 Minn. 1 (1877).
18. Rule 12.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure provides for
the serving of an answer after denial of a motion equivalent to the demurrer
of the defendant in the Keegan case.
19. Nelson v. Auman, 221 Minn. 46, 20 N. XW. 2d 702 (1945); Mc-
Govern v. Federal Land Bank, 209 Minn. 403, 296 N. XV. 473 (1941) ; In re
Liquidation of People's State Bank, 197 Minn. 479, 267 N. W. 482 (1936).
This rule does not, however, prohibit review of the taxation of costs and
disbursements on appeal from a judgment, since they are an integral part of
the judgment even though it be entered prior to their determination. Fall v.
Moore, 45 Minn. 517, 48 N. W. 404 (1891).
20. See Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
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judgment for the appellant. An example of the latter type of order
is one denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
There is no evidence, however, of the adoption of such a limited
meaning in the decisions of the court. On the contrary, the court
has stated that an order of reference, 21 an order denying a motion
for joinder of additional parties,2 an order on a motion to make
a complaint more definite and certain, 2 and a ruling on the ad-
missibility of evidence 24 are reviewable on appeal from a judgment.
Since none of these is an order "involving the merits, ' "" they must
have been regarded as orders "affecting the judgment :" yet a con-
trary decision on any of the motions would not definitely produce
a contrary judgment.
The adoption of the broader definition of the word "affccting"
would seem to be grounded in justice. An erroneous order on any
of the above motions might well dilute the rights of the appealing
party, and thereby entitle him to a reversal of the judgment against
him. With respect to those orders mentioned which could be
made before trial, if they could not be reviewed on appeal from the
judgment, they would never be reviewed, 2 and the party opposing
the order might be done an injustice. It seems, therefore, that any
intermediate order should be reviewable on appeal from the judg-
ment, unless it falls within the scope of the Bolstad holding.Y
There is language in support of this proposition in Rasc 7.
linneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. 2' Furthermore to adopt the
narrow interpretation of the word "affecting," so that the only
reviewable orders would be those which if reversed would result ill
certain judgment for the appellant, would be to render meaningle.,,
the supreme court's statutory power " to grant a new trial on appeal
from the judgment.
The court has stated that the following orders are reviewable
on appeal from the judgment entered: an order on a motion to
21. Bond v. Welcome, 61 Minn. 43, 45, 63 N. \V. 3, 4 (1895) (dictum).
22. Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288, 41 N. W. 2d 438, 143
(1950) (dictum).
23. State v. O'Brien, 83 Minn. 6, 85 N. W. 1135 (1901) (dictum).
24. Arnoldy v. Northwestern State Bank, 142 Minn. 449, 450, 172 N .W.
699 (1919) (dictum).
25. See cases cited notes 21-24 supra.
26. Orders made before trial are not reviewable on appeal from an
order denying new trial. See discussion below at pp. 116-118.
27. Bolstad v. Paul Bunyan Oil Co., 215 Minn. 166, 9 N. W. 2d 346(1943) (orders not a part of the proceedings resulting in judgment may not
be reviewed on appeal from that judgment).
28. 118 Minn. 437, 443, 137 N. W. 176, 179 (1912).
29. Minn. Stat. § 605.05 (1953).
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amend the pleadings ;30 an order refusing to set aside service of
summons ;31 an order refusing to strike a case from the calendar ;"
pre-trial discovery orders ;33 an order sustaining a demurrer and
denying leave to amend ;34 an order by the district court dismissing
an appeal from municipal court ;5 an order submitting the cause to
arbitration ;3 an order for judgment notwithstanding the demurrer,
the demurrer not being stricken out ;'- an order granting or denying
a change of venue;3 S an order on a motion to strike a part of the
complaint ;i an order on a motion to amend the findings of fact
and conclusions of law ;40 an order denying a motion to strike out
a bill of exceptions ;41 an order dealing with taxation of costs ;' an
order granting a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict ;43
an order directing delivery of personal property to the sheriff for
sale ;4 and an order for more definite and certain findings of fact
and conclusions of law.45
It is important to note that the supreme court has held that
an order denying new trial made before entry of judgment is re-
viewable on appeal from the judgment.40 This fact seems to imply
that all questions reviewable on appeal from an order denying new
trial are reviewable on appeal from the judgment if an order deny-
30. City of Winona v. Minnesota Ry. Constr. Co., 29 Minn. 68, 11 N. W.
228 (1882) ; Hanley v. Board of County Comm'rs, 87 Minn. 209, 210-11, 91
N. W. 756, 757 (1902) (dictum).
31. Crow v. Erie R- R., 153 Min. 553, 190 N. IV. 339, 340 (1922)(dictum) ; State ex rel Eau Claire Dells Improvement Co. v. District Court,
26 Minn. 233, 235, 2 N. W. 698, 700 (1879) (dictum).
32. Chadbourne v. Reed, 83 Minn. 447, 449, 86 N. W. 415, 416 (1901)
(dictum).
33. Brown v. St Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 30, 62 N. V. 2d 688, 699
(1954) (dictum).
34. Disbrow v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 110 Minn. 237, 125 N. W.
115 (1910); Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Lang, 230 Minn. 118, 120, 41 N. W.
2d 429, 430 (1950) (dictum) ; Johnson v. Union Savings Bank & Trust Co.,
196 Minn. 588, 589, 266 N. IV. 169, 170 (1936) (dictum).
35. Thompson v. Berg, 154 Minn. 149, 150, 191 N. W. 412 (1923)
(dictum).
36. Heglund v. Allen, 30 Minn. 38, 14 N. V. 57 (1882).
37. Keegan v. Peterson, 24 Minn. 1 (1877).
38. Schoch v. XVinona & St Paul R. R., 55 Minn. 479 57 N IV. -08
(1893) ; Hinds v. Backus, 45 Minn. 170, 47 N. W. 655 (18915.
39. Haug v. Haugan, 51 Minn. 558, 53 N. W. 874 (1892).
40. Rase v. Minneapolis, St P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 118 Mlinn. 437, 137
N. W. 176 (1912); Louis F. Dow Co. v. Bittner, 185 Minn. 499, 500, 241
N. W. 569 (1932) (dictum).
41. Baxter v. Coughlin, 80 Minn. 322, 324, 83 N. W. 190 (1900)
(dictum).
42. Felber v. Southern Minnesota Ry., 28 Minn. 156, 158, 9 N. W. 635(1881) (dictum).
43. Rieke v. St Albans Land Co., 180 Minn. 540, 231 N. V. 2- (1930).
44. Mower v. Hanford, 6 Minn. 535 (Gil. 372) (1861).
45. Frisbie v. Frisbie, 226 Minn. 435, 33 N. W. 2d 23 (1948).
46. Thayer v. Duffy, 240 Minm. 234, 63 N. W. 2d 28 (1953) ; .Mower v.
Hanford, 6 Minn. 535 (Gil. 372) (1861).
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ing new trial has been made before entry of judgment. It is also
important to realize the scope of review oi appeal from a judgment
when the appellant questions only the denial of his motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. In that case the supreme court
is restricted to deciding whether the trial court had jurisdiction,
whether it erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict, and
whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the verdict. 1
On appeal from a judgment modifying an earlier judgment.
any intermediate order involving the merits or affecting tle iodi-
fied judgment may be reviewed. 5 Examples of such orders are an
order denying new trial and the very order which modifies judg-
ment. Where modification is denied, however, the appeal must he
from the denying order itself, and it must be taken, if at all,
within thirty days after denial." It is not reviewable on appeal from
the judgment previously entered because, coming after entry of
that judgment, it does not qualify as an interm(ediate order affect-
ing the judgment."0
The scope of review of intermediate orders on appeal from an
order denying new trial is not as broad as it is on appeal from a
judgment. Generally. on an appeal from an order denying a new
trial, orders made before and after trial are not reviewable. 'his
rule is based on the logical conclusion that a motion for new trial
should only involve the trial court's consideration of occurrences
arising during trial. It will be seen that this logical rile has not
been strictly observed.
The court, in accordance with the logical rule stated above,
has held that pre-trial discovery orders,"' an order sustaining a
demurrer, -5 2 orders made on a motion to amend the pleadings,.' and
an order striking a portion of the answer5 ' are not reviewable on
appeal from an order denying new trial, since they are orders made
before trial. Brown v. St. 'aul City Ry. '' finally determined that
47. Louko v. Village of Hibbing, 222 Nlini. 463, 25 N. W. 2d 234I
(1946) ; Eichler v. Equity Farms, Inc., 194 Minn. 8, 259 N. W. 545 (1935).
48. Bilsborrow v. Pierce, 112 Minn. 336, 128 N. W. 16 (1910).
49. Nelson v. Auman, 221 Minn. 46, 20 N. W. 2d 702 (1945) ; Halvwr-
seml v. Orinoco Mining Co., 89 Minn. 470, 95 N. W. 320 (1903).
50. See cases cited note 19 supra.
51. Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N. W. 2d 688 (1954).
52. Grimes v. Ericson, 94 Minn. 461, 103 N. W. 334 (1905).
53. Manwaring v. O'Brien, 75 Minn. 542, 78 N. W. 1 (1899) ; Minne-
apolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Home Ins. Co., 64 Minn. 61, 66 N. W. 132
(1896).
54. Johnson v. Maryland Cas. Co.. 177 Min. 103. 104, 224 N. W. 700,
701 (1929) (dictum).
55. 241 Minn. 15, 62 N. W. 2d 688 (1954). The holding in this case
overruled dictum to the contrary in the earlier case of In re rrusteeship tnder
Will of Melegaard, 187 Minn. 632, 633, 246 N. W V. 478. 479 (1933).
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pre-trial discovery orders are not reviewable on appeal from an
order denying new trial. In that opinion the court intimates that a
writ of prohibition might be the remedy for the plight of an
individual who will be subject to a contempt citation if he does
not comply with the discovery order, but who might make any sub-
sequent review of the question on appeal meaningless by com-
plying and thereby "letting the cat out of the bag."
As was stated above, the court has not always observed the
logical rule. It has allowed the review of venue orders on appeal
from an order denying a new trial.56 In so doing the court admitted
that the practice was illogical, but acceded to it because it was
"convenient and calculated to end litigation. . . ."5- In another in-
stance where the court strayed from the logical rule, it consented
to decide the issue raised by an order made before trial refusing to
set aside a stipulation. 5s Before doing so, the court expressed its
doubts as to the reviewability of such an order on an appeal from
an order denying a new trial because it "was technically no part of
the trial."5 9 Also two early cases include dictun to the effect that an
order of reference ° and an order dismissing on the ground that the
complaint did not state a cause of action" are reviewable on appeal
from an order denying a new trial.
Because of this inconsistent pattern in the court's decisions on
questions of reviewability of orders made before trial on appeal
from an order denying new trial, it is difficult to predict the future
course. It seems, however, in view of the strong position taken in
the Brozwt case and in Zywiec v. South St. Paul, 2 the two most
recent decisions on the subject, that the court will abandon its
earlier position relating to orders refusing to set aside a stipulation,
orders of reference, and orders dismissing a complaint, and that the
rule of Brown and Zviec will be followed, if any new and related
problems arise. As to venue orders, where the court has consistently
admitted the deviation from the logical rule, a change does not
appear likely.
In the area of the post-trial orders the court has upheld the
56. Wilson v. Richards, 28 Minn. 337, 9 N. W. 872 (1881) ;Winegar
v. Martin, 148 Minn. 489, 490, 182 N. WV. 513 (1921) (dictum).
57. Wilson v. Richards, 28 Minn. 337, 339, 9 N. WV. 872 (1881). The
court prefers the use of mandamus for review of this question in the interest
of avoiding the waste of throwing out a whole trial. See Winegar v. Martin.
148 Minm. 489, 182 N. W. 513 (1921) ; Delasca v. Grimes, 144 Minn. 67, 174
N. W. 523 (1919).
58. Miller v. Nativick, 110 Minn. 448, 125 N. W. 1022 (1910).
59. Id. at 451, 125 N. W. at 1023.
60. Bond v. Welcome, 61 Minn. 43, 45, 63 N. WV. 3, 4 (1895) (dictum).
61. Thorp v. Lorenz, 34 Minn. 350, 25 N. V. 712 (1885).
62. 234 Minn. 18, 47 N. W. 2d 465 (1951).
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logical rule. It has refused to review an order denying a motion
to settle a case 3 and an order granting a new trial on the issue of
damages only.' In the case involving the latter order, decided in
1954, the court had this to say in support of the logical rule: "since
a new trial cannot be predicated upon post-trial errors, allegedly
erroneous post-trial errors cannot be reviewed on an appeal front
an order denying a new trial." 5
The court will not review an order denying a motion to amend
the findings of fact and conclusions of law,"' but it will review the
errors assigned to the findings and conclusions as part of its review
of an order denying new trial." The court will make tile necessary
modifications where an issue is settled as a matter of law, "in order
to avoid the delay and expense of further litigation."08 'rhus where
a record discloses a dispute over the facts, the court will review
the findings as part of the order denying new trial, and it will
grant a new trial, if it finds the evidence insufficient to support the
findings. Where the record discloses no dispute over the facts on
an issue, the court will decide the question as a matter of law
and amend the findings and conclusions.
Errors of Law Occurring at the Trial
Errors of law occurring during the course of the trial are re-
viewable on appeal from the judgment. The court has stated that
rulings on the admissibility of evidence'; and the instructions- to
which exceptions have been taken as well as orders made on mo-
tions to amend the pleadings 7 1 and motions for a jury trial17 are
reviewable. There is no indication that the review of rulings otil the
admissibility of evidence i., restricted to those rulings which if
63. State v. Atanosoff, 138 Mil. 321, 164 N. W. 1011 (1917) (a
criminal case in which the same rule was applied).
64. Thiesen v. Hellermann, 242 Minn. 218, 64 N. W. 2d 762 (19541.
65. Id. at 224, 64 N. W. 2d at 766.
66. Wilcox v. Nelson, 227 Minn. 545, 35 N. W. 2d 741 (1949) ; In Ie
Estate of Wilson, 223 Minn. 409, 27 N. W. 2d 429 (1947).
67. Farmers State Bank v. Anderson, 195 Minn. 475. 263 N. \V. -14,;
(1935) ; Sullivan v. Ebner, 195 Minn. 232, 262 N. W. 574 (1935).
68. In re Estate of Arnt. 237 Minn. 245. 251, 54 N. V. 2d 333. 337
(1952).
69. Arnoldy v. Northwestern State Bank, 142 Minn. 449, 450, 172 N \V
699 (1919) (dictum). But see LeMay v. Minneapolis Street Ry.. 245 MNinu
192, 197, 71 N. W. 2d 826, 829 (1955) (dictum).
70. Petrich v. Village of Chisholm, 180 Minn. 407, 231 N. V. 14 (1930)
Peterson v. Township of Manchester, 162 Minn. 486, 487, 203 N. V. 432
(1925) (dictum).
71. Hanley v. Board of County Commissioner,. 87 Minn. 209. 211. 91
N. V. 756. 757 (1902) (dictmn) ; Macauley v. Ryan, 55 Minn. 507. 509. 57
N. XW. 151 (1893) (dictum).
72. Swanson v..\lworth. 159 Mimn. 193. 194. 198 N. XV. '153 (102-1)
(dictum).
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reversed would result in a judgment for the appellant. Here, as in
the case of review of intermediate orders, so to restrict the scope
of review on appeal from the judgment would render superfluous
the power given the court to order a new trial on appeal from the
judgment.7
So too on appeal from an order denying new trial, errors of
law occurring at the trial are reviewable.7 4 Examples of such
errors of law are a ruling on evidence,7" an order on a motion to
amend the pleadings made during the course of tie trial," an order
refusing a jury trial,77 and an order dismissing the action on the
pleadings made after the cause has been called for trial. 5 The
court seems to have chosen the time that the cause is called for
trial as the dividing line between the pre-trial and the trial periods.D
Extra-Record Errors
The extra-record errors such as irregularities in the proceedings
on the trial resulting in a deprivation of a fair trial, misconduct
of counsel or jury, accident or surprise, and although not really
an error, the discovery of new evidence, are all specified as grounds
for new trial.so Their reviewability on appeal from an order denying
new trial seems to have been accepted without question, and right-
fully so, for they are clearly questions which come within the mean-
ing of the phrase "involved in the order."
No case has dealt with the question whether these extra-record
errors are reviewable on appeal from the judgment. The ordinary
rule is that the court will review only those questions raised by the
record."' It has been held, however, that an order denying a new
trial made before entry of judgment is reviewable on appeal from
the judgment.8 2 If a motion for new trial which asserts extra-record
73. See Minn. Stat § 605.05 (1953).
74. See notes 75-78 infra. This phrase "errors of law" is further dis-
cussed in the section relating to appeal from an order granting a new trial
at p. 122 infra.
75. Arnoldy v. Northwestern State Bank, 142 Minm 449, 450, 172 N. W.
699 (1919) (dictum).
76. Hanley v. Board of County Commissioners, 87 Minn. 209, 211, 91
N. V. 756, 757 (1902) (dictum); Macauley v. Ryan, 55 Minn. 507, 509, 57
N. W. 151 (1893) (dictum).
77. Hasey v. McIMullen, 109 Minn. 332, 123 N. W. 1078 (1909).
78. Hine v. Myrick, 60 Minn. 518, 62 N. W. 1125 (1895).
79. Hasey v. McMullen, 109 Minn. 332, 336, 123 N. W. 1078, 1080
(1909) ; Hine v. Mfyrick, 60 Minn. 518, 62 N. W. 1125 (1895).
80. See Minn. R_ Civ. P. 59.01 and Minn. Stat. § 547.01 (1949). The
statute specified the grounds for new trial and is now superseded by Rule
59.01.
81. Thelen v. Gartner, 226 Minn. 36, 31 N. W. 2d 639 (1948).
82. See cases cited note 46 supra.
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error is decided before the judgment appealed from is entered, no
reason would appear to prohibit the review of such error on appeal
from a judgment.
Excessive or Insufficient Damages
Error in awarding excessive or insufficient danlages is a ground
for new trial,"8 and its reviewability on appeal from an order deny-
ing new trial does not appear ever to have been questioned. As in
the case of the extra-record errors, it should be reviewable on appeal
from the judgment, if it has first been raised before the trial court
on a motion for new trial. In one case where a defendant admitted
his liability and submitted the case to the trial court for the assess-
ment of damages, the supreme court held that the assessment was
reviewable oil appeal from the judgment." This it would appealr
that the important factor in determining whether such a question
is reviewable is action by the trial court on the question. \Where
the case is tried to a court, or where the question is raised on tile
motion for new trial, it should be reviewable oil appeal from the
judgment.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the
verdict"8 or support the findings of fact is reviewable both on an
appeal from a judgment"6 and on an appeal from an order denying
new trial.8 7 On appeal from a judgment, when the cause was tried
to a court, the question is reviewable though there was no motion
for a new trial."' If the cause was tried to a jury, in order for such
question to be reviewable there must have been either a motion for
a directed verdict, s" for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,"" or
for a new trial,' giving the trial court an opportunity to pass upon
the question. Where the appeal is from an order denying new trial.
the court has applied the same reasoning. Thus in a court tried cae
83. See note 80 supra.
84. Kent v. Bown, 3 Minn. 347 (Gil. 246) (1859).
85. See cases cited notes 89-91 infra.
86. Twin City Bus Co. v. Rechtzigel, 229 Minn. 196, 38 N. W. 2d 825
(1949) (by implication) ; Maut v. Maust, 222 Minn. 135, 23 N. W. 2d 537
(1946) (by implication).
87. Schaedler v. New York Life Ins. Co., 201 Minn. 327. 276 N. V.
235 (1937) ; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Brown, 152 Minn. 325. 188 N. V
569 (1922) Hrdlicka v. Haberman, 140 Minn. 124,167 N. W. 363 (1918)
88. Twin City Bus Co. v. Rechtzigel, 229 Minn. 196, 38 N. W. 2d 825
(1949) ; Maust v. Maust, 222 Minn. 135, 23 N. W. 2d 537 (1946).
89. Robbins v. New York Life Ins. Co., 195 Minn. 205. 262 N. V. 210
(1935).
90. Ibid.
91. In re Estate of Ydstie. 195 Minn. 501. 263 N. WV. 447 (1935) : I c
Mieux v. Cosgrove, 155 Minn. 353, 193 N. W. 586 (1923).
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the question of the sufficiency of the evidence may be reviewed,
even though it was not raised on the motion for new trial."
Conclusions of Law
The question whether the findings of fact support the conclu-
sions of law can be reviewed on appeal from the judgment." This
question may also be reviewed on appeal from an order denying
a new trial,94 if it was assigned as error on the motion for new
trial. 95 The court has recognized that the practice is not logically
sound, but because it is "convenient to be able to raise the ques-
tion ... without entry of judgment . . ."' review is allowed. The
court will not grant a new trial if it finds error; it will simply make
the necessary modifications in the conclusions." The parties are
then left to initiate the next step in resolving the case. If the re-
spondent wishes to question the sufficiency of the evidence to justify
the findings by moving for a new trial after the modification has
altered the conclusions so that they are no longer in his favor, he
will be allowed to do so even though the specified time in which
to make such a motion has run.95
Errors on Former Trial
WNhen a new trial of all issues is granted or a mistrial order is
made, the trial is wholly set aside and the case stands as if there
had been no trial." On appeal from the judgment after the second
(third, etc.) trial, the court will review neither the proceedings at
the first trial nor the order granting a new trial.'0 0 This rule should
not bar the review of orders made before the first trial because the
order granting new trial does not nullify their effect.' 0' If, however,
92. See cases cited note 87 supra.
93. Naffke v. Naffke, 240 Minn. 468, 62 N. IV. 2d 63 (1953) ; Lee v.
Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 36 N. W. 2d 530 (1949).
94. Johnson v. Johnson, 223 Minn. 420, 27 N. W. 2d 289 (1947);
Lumberman's Ins. Co. v. St. Paul, 82 Minn. 497, 85 N. W. 525 (1901). The
better practice is to move in the trial court to modify and correct the con-
clusions. Farnham v. Thompson, 34 Minn. 330, 26 N. XV. 9 (1885).
95. Lindgren v. Bailey, 168 Minn. 500, 210 N. WV. 392 (1926) ; Holm-
strom v. Barstad, 147 Minn. 172, 179 N. W. 737 (1920).
96. Lumberman's Ins. Co. v. St. Paul, 82 Minn. 497, 504, 85 N. W. 525,
527 (1901).
97. See cases cited note 94 supra.
98. Lumberman's Ins. Co. v. St. Paul, 82 Minn. 497, 85 N. W. 525(1901).
99. Patton v. Minneapolis Street Ry., 245 Minn. 396, 71 N. W. 2d 861(1955) ; Backstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 194 .Min., 67, 259 N. NV. 681(1935).
100. Patton v. Minneapolis Street Ry., supra note 99.
101. Such orders cannot be reviewed on a motion for new trial. See the
section on the scope of review on appeal from an order granting new trial
at p. 122 infra.
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the new trial was granted on only one or a part of the issues, the
judgment after the second trial rests upon issues determined at
both trials, and the proceedings on the first trial relevant to the
issues resolved on that trial as well as the order granting new trial
may be reviewed on appeal from the judgment entered after the
second trial.
10 2
If the appeal after the second (third, etc.) trial is from an
order denying new trial, there can be no review of the proceedings
of the first trial or of the order granting new trial, even though
the grant of a new trial was only as to a single issue or a part of
the issues.' 0  This holding is part of the logical rule discussed
above, restricting the scope of review on appeal from an order deny-
ing a new trial to "the regularity of those things which were in-
volved in the order" Since the motion for new trial after the second
trial could reach only the question before the court in the second
trial itself, only those questions are "involved in the order" and
therefore reviewable.10 4
Appeal from an Order Granting a Nev Trial
Only those orders granting a new trial which are grounded
"exclusively upon errors of law occurring at the trial . . ." and so
specified by the trial court in its order, are appealable.'(" On appeal
the order "may be sustained for errors of law prejudicial to re-
spondent other than those specified by the trial court."'0 6 Thus, in
any event, the scope of review on appeal from an order granting
new trial is limited to those questions falling within the definition
of the phrase "errors of law occurring at the trial."
It seems that those questions which require the application Of
the discretionary power of the trial court in their decision are not
included within the scope of that phrase.107 The reason for this
rule is that the trial court, with the advantage of being able to
observe the proceedings, is in a much better position to decide
such discretionary questions; appeals from an order granting a new
trial on any of those grounds would be dilatory, costly, and useless
in most instances. ° In Spicer v. Stebbins °0 the supreme court
102. Lundblad v. Erickson, 180 Minn. 185, 230 N. W. 473 (1930).
103. Zywiec v. South St. Paul, 234 Minn. 18, 47 N. W. 2d 465 (1951).
104. Zywiec v. South St. Paul, supra note 103.
105. Minn. Stat. § 605.09(4) (1953). See also Cunningham, supra note
3, at 341-44.
106. Minn. Stat. § 605.09(4) (1953). Storey v. Weinberg, 226 Minn.
48, 31 N. W. 2d 912 (1948).
107. See Spicer v. Stebbins, 184 Minn. 77, 237 N. W. 844 (1931).
108. See Spicer v. Stebbins, supra note 107.
109. 184 Minn. 77, 237 N. W. 844 (1931).
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suggested that this reasoning should exclude from review questions
of the sufficiency of the evidence, irregularities not amounting to
errors of law, misconduct of jurors or the parties, accident or sur-
prise, excessive or inadequate damages, and newly discovered evi-
dence. The court has actually held that questions of the sufficiency
of the evidence,' misconduct of the parties,"' and excessive or
inadequate damages"12 are not reviewable. Contrary to the sugges-
tion in the Spicer case, the court has reviewed the question of
newly discovered evidence on an appeal from an order granting new
trial." 3 These cases might be distinguishable, however, because the
order for new trial came after entry of judgment and was thus
appealable as an order vacating judgment.'"
The opinion in Roelofs v. Baber"n suggests that the phrase
"errors of law occurring at the trial" refers to errors of the trial
judge in the conduct of the trial. Prime examples of the type of
question which falls within the category of "errors of law occurring
at the trial" are errors in rulings and instructions made during the
progress of the trial.""' The term rulings includes questions con-
cerning the admissibility of evidence,"' orders made during the
trial on a motion to amend the pleadings,"' an order made on a
motion for jury trial," 9 and an order granting a motion for a
directed verdict.
2 0
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER ON A BLENDED MNOTION
The supreme court has held that section 605.06 of the Minnesota
appeals statutes authorizes an appeal from the "whole order" made
110. Schommer v. Eischens, 148 Minn. 486, 182 N. WV. 166 (1921);
Gutmann v. Anderson, 142 Minn. 141, 171 N. W. 303 (1919).
111. Master Poultry Breeders, Inc. v. Iowa Hardware Mut. Ins. Co..
219 Minn. 440, 18 N. W. 2d 39 (1945); Heide v. Lyons, 128 Minn. 488, 151
N.W. 139 (1915).
112. Voller v. Schmitz, 236 Minn. 155, 52 N. W. 2d 289 (1952) ; Roelofs
v. Baber, 194 Minn. 166, 259 N. W. 808 (1935).
113. See Vasatka v. Matsch, 216 Minn. 530, 535, 13 N. W. 2d 483, 486
(1944) ; Kruchowski v. St Paul City Ry., 195 Minn. 537, 263 N. W. 616,
265 N. W. 303, 821 (1935).
114. Kruchowsld v. St Paul City Ry., supra note 113.
115. 194 Minn. 166, 259 N.W. 808 (1935).
116. See Roelofs v. Baber, supra note 115.
117. See Arnoldy v. Northwestern State Bank, 142 Minn. 449, 451, 172
N. W. 699, 700 (1919) (dictum). The language in Bakkensen v. Minneapolis
Street Ry., 180 Minn. 344, 345, 230 N. W. 787 (1930) might be interpreted
to mean that an incorrect ruling on admissibility of evidence is not an error
of law, but more likely the words refer to the defective specification of
grounds for granting a new trial by the trial court.
118. Macauley -. Ryan, 55 Minn. 507, 509, 57 N. W. 151 (1893)
(dictum).
119. See Hasey v. McMullen, 109 Minn. 332, 336, 123 N. W. 1078, 1080
(1909) (dictum).




on a motion in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or for new trial.12 If the order on the alternative miotion
grants the motion for new trial, there is the added requirement
that the motion must have been granted exclusively for errosr, of
law occurring at the trial in order for the "whole order" to be
appealable.' It appears that only the party who received the
verdict which the alternative motions attack can appeal from the
whole order if either part of it is granted." '
On appeal from an order granting judgment notwithstaniding
the verdict and tentatively granting or denying a new trial, tle
provisions of Rule 50.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
seem to assume that the supreme court will first review the order
granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict. If that order i-
reversed, the provisions of Rule 50.02 requiring the trial court to
rule on the motion for new trial even though it grants the motion
for judgment, make it possible for the supreme court then to
proceed directly to a review of the order oin the motion for new
trial.1
2 -
On appeal by the moving party from an order deuying both
alternatives, the court may review the action of the trial court on
both parts of the motion.' 2' Of course, the court will not review the
order denying new trial if it decides to grant judgment notwith-
standing.
If it becomes necessary to consider that part of a "whole order"
granting a new trial, it appears that the scope of review would be
limited as it is on appeal from that order made alone. l'hus oilv
errors of law occurring at the trial would be reviewable. Likewise
the scope of review of that part of the order denying a motion for
new trial would seem to be comparable to the sco1)e on appeal frolmi
such an order alone. Thus in one case involving an appeal from the
whole order, the court refused to review an order overruling a
demurrer and denying a motion to strike.""0
121. Allison v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 240 Minn. 547, 62 N. W. 2d
374 (1954) ; Snyder v. Minnetonka & W. B. Nay. Co., 151 Minn. 3. 185
N. IV. 959 (1921).
122. Shaumburg v. Ludwig, 240 Minn. 128, 60 N. W. 2d 12 (1953).
Greenberg v. National Council of K. & L. of S., 132 Minn. 84, 155 N. \V.
1053 (1916).
123. St. Anthony Falls Bank v. Graham, 67 Minn. 318, 69 N. \\ 1077
(1897); Snyder v. Minnetonka & W. B. Nay. Co., 151 Minn. 36, 4t. 185
N. V. 959, 961 (1921) (dictum).
124. The Rule changes the old practice. See McGinley v. Chicago. M. &
St. P. Ry., 152 Minn. 48, 187 N. W. 829 (1922).
125. Welsh v. Barnes-Duluth Shipbuilding Co., 221 Minn. 37. 41. 21
N. V. 2d 43, 45 (1945) (by implication).
126. See Matesic v. Maras. 177 Minn. 240, 225 N. V. 84 (1929)
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NOTE
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
The Effect of a Previous Appeal
Where, in the same action, there has been an earlier appeal
from an order denying a new trial, which order the supreme court
affirmed on the merits, no questions which might have been raised
on that appeal are available to the same party on a subsequent
appeal from the judgment.12 7 Thus only pre-trial orders and post-
trial orders made before entry of judgment would be reviewable on
the subsequent appeal. Similarly where there has been a previous
appeal from an order granting a new trial and the order has been
reversed, no question which night have been raised on that appeal
is reviewable on the subsequent appeal from the judgment. "' This
rule would exclude from review any questions falling within the
category of errors of law occurring at the trial. The mere dismissal
of a former appeal from an intermediate order does not, however,
bar the appellant from raising the same questions involved in the
order on a subsequent appeal from the judgment.129
An Order Appealable in Part and Non-Appealable in Part
An order appealable in part and non-appealable in part presents
for review only that part which is appealable-' A contrary state-
ment in an earlier case does not seem to have been followed."3 ' The
substance of this general rule seems to have been applied by the
court to an order on an alternative motion to amend the findings and
conclusions of for new trial.13 2 The court, however, has created
an exception where an issue concerning the findings and conclusions
can be settled as a matter of law.2 2 The extension of this exception
to other situations might well be advisable in the interest of pre-
venting the unnecessary expense of further litigation. Generally,
where an appellant wishes to have both parts of an order reviewed,
he will have to appeal from the judgment.2 4 Where the appealable
part of an order is the part which grants a new trial before entry
of judgment, however, appeal from the judgment is impossible,
and two appeals may become necessary if justice is to be done.
127. Skog v. Pomiush, 221 Minn. 11, 20 N. W. 2d 530 (1945).
128. School Dist. No. 1 v. Aiton, 175 Minn. 346, 221 N. NV. 424 (1928).
129. Bilsborrow v. Pierce, 112 Minn. 336, 128 N. W. 16 (1910).
130. Muggenburg v. Leighton, 240 Minn. 21, 60 N. W. 2d 9 (1953);
Storey v. Weinberg, 226 Minn. 48, 31 N. XV. 2d 912 (1948) : Marty v.
Nordby, 201 Minn. 469, 276 N. W. 739 (1937).
131. See Long v. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 163, 253 N. W.
762 (1934) (whole order reviewable if part is appealable).
132. See note 66 supra.
133. See note 68 supra.
134. See Muggenburg v. Leighton, 240 Minn. 21, 60 N. W. 2d 9 (1953).
1956]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW[
Questions Which Can be Settled as a Matter of Law
It seems that the court will review a question which it ordinarily
would not review, where the issue can be settled as a matter of law.
Thus on an appeal from an order granting or denying a motion for
new trial made on the ground of inadequate damages only, the
defendant, whether he be appellant... or respondent,"' may urge
his non-liability as a matter of law. If the court finds that as a
matter of law defendant is not liable, the new trial on the issue of
damages will be denied and the defendant can then take the neces-
sary steps to secure the judgment in his favor."17
Questions Raised by the Respondent
On appeal, the respondent may urge and the court will conshidr
-any sound reason for affirmance, even though it is one not as-
signed by the trial court."' ' Thus where the record showed fraud
as a matter of law, the supreme court affirmed an order denying
a new trial, although the trial court made no findings on the ques-
tion of fraud."' In one earlier case, however, the respondent
alleged the court's lack of jurisdiction over him as a ground for
affirmance of the order denying new trial, but the court refused to
consider the question because such a practice "would tend to con-
fusion."' ° Thus in that case because the supreme court reversed
the trial court and granted the motion for new trial, the respondent
was subjected to the expense of another trial before he could raise
the question, which if decided in his favor would nullify the second
trial also.
CONCLUSION
It does not appear to be completely true that the scope of review
on appeal from an order denying new trial is "different from and
broader than" the scope of review on appeal from a judgment, as
the supreme court stated in the Crawford case." Indeed, when the
order denying new trial comes before entry of judgment, the scope
135. Maki v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 122 Minn. 444, 142 N. W. 705
(1913).
136. Caswell v. Minar Motor Co., 240 Minn. 213, 60 N. W. 2d 263
(1953) ; Shearer v. Puent, 166 Minn. 425, 208 N. W. 182 (1926).
137. Maki v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 122 Minn. 444, 142 N. W. 705
(1913).
138. Olson v. Buskey, 220 Minn. 155, 163, 19 N. W. 2d 57, 61 (1945)
Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Clarkson Securities Co., 205 Minn. 517, 287
N. W. 15 (1939).
139. See Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Clarkson Securities Co.. 205
Minn. 517, 287 N. W. 15 (1939).
140. See Lewis v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R.. 131 Minn. 122. 15-1
N. W. 945 (1915).
141. See text at note 2 supra.
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of the two appeals is duplicative to a great extent. On appeal from
a judgment the scope of review includes both pre-trial orders and
post-trial orders made prior to judgment. Only when the order
denying new trial is made after entry of judgment does appeal from
that order serve a unique function. Extra-record errors and errors
not properly preserved for review during the course of the trial
are reviewable on appeal from the order denying new trial, but not
on appeal from the judgment. If the clerks of the district courts
were to adopt the practice of entering judgment "forthwith" as
recommended by Rule 58 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 42 a motion for new trial would be made after entry of judg-
ment, and the appeal from an order denying that motion would
take on added importance. Under the present system, however,
wherein a stay of entry of judgment is common practice, it appears
that the right to appeal from an order denying new trial constitutes
nothing more than a trap for the practitioner who is unaware of its
limited scope of review.
Of course, there is an indirect advantage to the appeal from the
order denying new trial, namely, the stay of entry of judgment,
which has the effect of staying both enforcement 1' and the attach-
ing of the judgment lien."" To eliminate the possibility of misdirected
appeals made by lawyers pursuing this ephemeral advantage, the
legislature should either liberalize statutory provisions allowing
stay of enforcement' 4 5 and deposit in lieu of the judgment lien,"40
or it should broaden the scope of review on appeal from the order
denying new trial.
The right to appeal from the "whole order" on an alternative
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial
is subject to the same criticism insofar as it permits a less broad
review than does an appeal from a judgment. The right to appeal
from an order granting new trial, however, should be maintained
as it now exists. It serves a special purpose in that it brings up for
review rulings of the trial court which, if found to be erroneous,
will eliminate the need for a second trial.
142. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 58.01.
143. See note 5 supra.
144. See Minn. Stat. § 548.09 (1953).
145. See note 5 supra.
146. See Minn. Stat. § 548.12 (1953).
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